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11. Introduction
When firms commit to increased levels of disclosure, the potential for information
asymmetries to arise between the management of the firm and its shareholders or among buyers
and sellers of the firm’s shares diminishes. There are many reasons why a firm would choose to
reduce information asymmetry by increasing disclosure. Managers who anticipate making capital
market transactions (issuing public debt or equity or acquiring another company in a stock
transaction) have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce the information risk borne
by investors which, in turn, reduces the firm’s cost of external financing.1  Firms with high levels
of disclosure are also more likely attract investors who are more confident that stock transactions
occur at “fair” prices, thereby increasing the liquidity in the stock (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991a, 1991b, 1994). Voluntary disclosure can also lower the cost of
information acquisition for analysts and hence increase their supply.2
Most of the empirical evidence on the economic consequences of increased disclosure
has focused on U.S. firms with publicly registered securities under current U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The disclosure environment is already rich, so that
commitments to increased levels of disclosure have limited economic impact. In contrast, the
disclosure levels mandated by securities market regulators in many countries around the world
have been criticized as relatively low (Decker, 1994; Rader, 1994). One important context in
which international differences in disclosure standards matter is when non-U.S. firms choose to
list their shares on U.S. exchanges or register their securities with the S.E.C. for a public offering
of shares to U.S. investors. There are, of course, many reasons why a firm may choose to list
                                         
1 See Barry and Brown (1984, 1985), Myers and Majluf (1984), Merton (1987), and Healy and Palepu, (1993, 2001)
2 See Bhushan (1989), Rajan and Servaes (1997), Lang and Lu holm (1996), Healy,Hutton, and Palepu (1999).
The ability to signal management or firm quality (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000), concerns about litigation risk from
delayed disclosure and the importance of stock-based compensation contracts for managers are other potential
motives (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
2shares in the U.S. including access to capital, greater liquidity, lower cost of capital and
corporate prestige. However, surveys of corporate managers about the decision to list in the U.S.
most often cite the process of reconciling home-country and U.S. reporting and disclosure
standards as a substantial challenge.3 For example, Fanto and Karmel (1997) report that three of
the top six “difficulties” experienced in a U.S. listing include accounting reconciliation (cited by
15 percent of listing managers, 21 percent of non-listing managers), preparation of Management
Discussion and Analysis (10 percent listed, 7 percent unlisted) and segment reporting (6 percent
listed, 11 percent unlisted).  Notwithstanding these difficulties, there has been a huge increase in
the number of non-U.S. firms listing on U.S. markets through public offerings on the NYSE,
Amex, and Nasdaq and through over-the-counter (OTC) listings on the OTC Bulletin Board,
“pink sheets,” and even private placements by means of S.E.C. Rule 144a offerings.
The objective of this study is to evaluate the economic impact of the increased disclosure
faced by non-U.S. firms when they list their shares on U.S. markets. Specifically, we examine
the price volatility and volume reactions to earnings announcements by these firms before and
after their U.S. listing. To this end, we assemble a sample of 2,695 earnings announcement
events for 427 firms from over 40 emerging and developed markets around the world. We
compare the volatility and volume reactions to earnings announcements before and after the U.S.
listing and relate these differences to firm, industry, and country level attributes. Our motivation
to examine capital market reactions to earnings announcements stems from the analytical and
empirical studies that emphasize the role of information asymmetry and differential information
processing by investors in evaluating those reactions.4 These studies show how the volume
                                         
3 It is also cited as a great challenge for U.S. based investors diversifying their portfolios into international markets.
See “Cherchez la footnote” Forbes (December 24, 2001).
4 The seminal studies in this area include Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) Kim and Verrecchia, (1991a, 1991b,
1994), Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995).
3reaction to an earnings announcement is an increasing function of both the magnitude of the
price reaction and the level of information asymmetry among investors. How the volume and
volatility reactions to earnings announcements change after non-U.S. firms list in the U.S. can
help us to infer how the quality of the information environment has been affected. If, for
example, we find that the reactions diminish upon listing, one could infer that the prior
information among investors is now of higher quality, generating less noise and lower residual
uncertainty. Alternatively, volume and volatility reactions could arise if the costs of information
acquisition are lower, yielding more analyst coverage of the stock and allowing more precise
private information to be incorporated into prices. Finally, this outcome could arise if there is
less disagreement among investors in interpreting the information content of the public
announcement or less asymmetry of private information among investors.
Two unique aspects of this setting make our experiment particularly useful and help us to
contribute to the literature on increased disclosure. First, disclosure standards and other capital
market characteristics differ widely across countries. The disparity between local and U.S.
GAAP should be particularly great for companies from emerging economies with poor
disclosure standards. Our sample of listings affords us a rich cross-section of countries with
which to relate the capital market reactions we uncover to the degree of increased disclosure the
firm faces. Volume and volatility reactions around earnings announcements should be larger for
those companies from emerging economies or those with weaker disclosure standards. Second,
our sample includes U.S. listings on major exchanges, OTC markets as well as private
placements. Full reconciliation with U.S. GAAP is required only for exchange listings; the
disclosure standards are lower for OTC listings and are minimal for 144a private placements.
This range of choices for a U.S. listing allows us as researchers to isolate the capital market
effects of listing from that associated with increased disclosure. Firms that list in the U.S.
4through private placement offerings should experience no significant change in volume/volatility
reactions to earnings due to increased disclosure.
Recent studies have uncovered significant, positive share price reactions associated with
U.S. listings by non-U.S. companies and have proposed different hypotheses to explain these
findings.5 Our study also contributes to this literature, as few previous authors have focused on
the importance of the change in the information environment. Foe ster and Karolyi (1999) and
Miller (1999) find statistically significant share price effects around U.S. listings and show how
these effects are consistent with the “investor recognition” hypothesis of Merton (1987). The
hypothesis proposes that investors pay a premium for familiar assets: a U.S. listing exposes more
shareholders to those shares, the "unfamiliarity discount" dissipates, and stock prices increase.
Unfortunately, these studies do not evaluate and, at best, only indirectly control for the change in
the information environment. Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2001) show that U.S. listings by
non-U.S. firms are associated with greater visibility with significant increases in the number of
analysts following the stock and the number of media “hits.” However, they do not evaluate the
economic impact of the change in visibility. Finally, there are several analytical models of the
U.S. listing decision that relate to disclosure requirements (Cantal , 1998, Fuerst, 1998; Moel,
1999; Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier, 1999). These models predict that larger, higher
quality firms in low-disclosure-quality environments will optimally disclose more information
and experience a capital gain at the time of listing as a reward for signaling their higher quality
                                         
5 Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987, 1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Miller (1999) argue that
magnitude of investment barriers and the international segmentation of capital markets can explain the price effects.
Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2000) emphasize the greater liquidity and efficiency of U.S. capital markets. Coffee
(1999), Stulz (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2001) and Doidge (2001) focus on the better legal protection for
minority shareholders provided by U.S. securities law. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001) argue that the higher
valuation of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. markets can be explained by the high agency costs of controlling
shareholders. Karolyi (1998) surveys this literature. Salv  (2000) studies non U.K. firms that list in the U.K.
5relative to peers that do not list. Only Moel provides some empirical support and only regarding
the likelihood of listing, not price effects.
We find a pronounced impact of the increased disclosure faced by non-U.S. firms after
they list in the U.S. Surprisingly, the abnormal return volatility and trading volume in the home
market around earnings announcements are significantly higher in the period following the
listing than in the period before the listing. Moreover, we find that the most dramatic increase
occurs for those firms that list from developed markets and those that do not list on a major
exchange. The increased market reaction to earnings shocks after cross listing is particularly
prominent for firms from developed countries with relatively weak disclosure requirements. We
interpret these results in the context of theoretical and empirical work on the economic effects of
increased disclosure and, especially, those studies that focus on the market reaction to the public
announcement of earnings. To the extent that our results are not consistent with the predictions
of these models, we explore alternative interpretations and explanations.
In the next section, we discuss the institutional and theoretical background and outline the
main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Results are presented
in section 4. We conclude the paper discussing alternative interpretations of our findings and
implications for further research and for policymakers.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Capital Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements
The market’s reaction to the public announcement of earnings has been one of the
primary streams of research in the accounting literature. While much of the work has focused on
price reactions, others have also examined trading volume and the relation between volume and
price reactions for what it reveals about the market’s reaction to increased disclosure. The
6seminal analytical studies by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Kim and Verrecchia (1991a,
1991b, 1994) establish the intuition that trading volume reactions reflect differences among
individual investors in the price formation process. The differences stem from information
asymmetry which arise when investors acquire private information and the quality (precision) of
the private information differs. Specifically, they show that trading volume reactions to public
announcements, like earnings, is an increasing function of the magnitude of the price reaction
and the level of information asymmetry among investors. When new information, such as
earnings, is announced, investors with more precise private information will make smaller
revisions of expected value of the stock than less-informed investors with less precise private
information. The differential revisions of expected value generate trading volume. Trading
volume and absolute price changes reflect the average change in investors’ expectations which is
related to the economic importance of the public information, but trading volume also reflects
differences among investors’ expectations revisions due to information asymmetry.
Empirical work on volume and volatility reactions to earnings announcements has
validated these basic predications.6 Atia e and Bamber (1994), for example, compute two
empirical proxies for information asymmetry using the dispersion and range in analysts earning
forecasts. They find that both proxies are significantly positively related to trading volume
reactions to earnings announcements, even after controlling for the magnitude of the associated
price reaction. In our paper, we will follow the same basis for our key hypotheses that the
magnitude of trading volume reactions to earnings announcements is positively related to both
the associated price volatility and the level of information asymmetry. We will also control for
information asymmetry using one of the same proxies (dis erson of analyst forecasts), but, in
                                         
6 See Atiase and Bamber (1994), Bamber and Cheon (1995), Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995), Utama and
Cready (1997), Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1997), and Barron and Stuerke (1998). The survey studies by Healy and
Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) cite a number of these empirical papers.
7comparing the volume and volatility reactions before and after the U.S. listing, we seek to detect
changes in the information environment. If the quality (precision) of the prior private
information is greater or if the costs of information acquisition are lower after listing on U.S.
markets, we expect less residual uncertainty and lower absolute abnormal returns around
earnings announcements. With less information asymmetry (ceteris paribus), we also expect
lower abnormal volume reactions.
Volume and volatility reactions to public earnings announcements can be understood in
terms of differences across investors in interpreting public announcements instead of asymmetry
of private information. Grundy and McNichols (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), He and Wang
(1995) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) propose that volume reflects differences in opinion
among speculative investors.7 Kandel and Pearson specifically use the example of earnings
announcements to show that significant positive abnormal volume can arise even when there is
no change in valuation in response to the announcements.  They also show that forecast revisions
among analysts around earnings are frequent and sizable, which they argue is consistent with
different likelihood functions to interpret public announcements. Bessembinder, Chan and
Seguin (1996) test these models using open interest in S&P 500 index futures contracts as a
proxy for divergences in traders’ opinions to forecast market volume and volume on individual
equities.
2.2 International Cross-listings and Disclosure Issues
Our study includes international cross-listings of all forms, including American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs), ordinary listings, and even global registered shares (GRS ). Almost
                                         
7 There is a new literature that focuses on volume as a source of information about firm value, rather than explaining
volume as a consequence of asymmetry of private information signals or differences of opinion. Important
contributions include Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993), Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994), Wang (1994) and
Kim and Verrecchia (2001). Chapter 6 of O’Hara (1997) synthesizes these different strands of the literature.
8all non-U.S. companies that list their shares on U.S. exchanges do so by creating ADRs. ADRs
are investment vehicles for investors to register and earn dividends on non-U.S. stock without
direct access to the overseas market itself. U.S.-based depositary banks hold the overseas
securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into
U.S. dollars for receipt holders. Each receipt represents shares in the home market and new
receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite number of shares are
deposited in their custodial account. Cancellations of ADRs reverse the process.
There are many advantages to ADRs for issuers including an enlarged investor base,
access to capital, greater liquidity, and corporate prestige. At the same time, non-U.S. companies
must satisfy two requirements to be listed in the U.S. First, they must arrange with a transfer
agent and registrar appropriate settlement facilities that can coordinate with the home market.
Second, to register with the S.E.C., the company must file a registration statement and furnish an
annual report on a Form 20-F with a reconciliation with U.S. GAAP. There are several options
for issuers to balance these advantages and costs. Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter on the
OTC Bulletin Board or as a “pink sheet” issue with limited liquidity, but they require only
minimal SEC disclosure and no GAAP reconciliation (exempt from Form 20-F by Rule 12g3-
2(b) exemption. Level 2 and 3 ADRs are exchange-listed securities and they require full SEC
disclosure with Form 20-F, a “current events” Form 6K which can include extensive information
and compliance with the exchange’s own listing rules.8 Level 3 programs raise capital and must
be associated with Form F-2 and F-3 filings for offerings. Finally, S.E.C. Rule 144a issues raise
capital as private placements to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) and, as a result, do not
require compliance with GAAP. These 144a programs trade on the PORTAL system with very
                                         
8 The NYSE, for example, also requires semi-annual reports by home country GAAP and encourages quarterly
reports as well.
9limited liquidity. Table 1 summarizes these differences in registration, reporting and disclosure
requirements.9
Ordinary listings and GRSs represent important alternatives to ADR f r cross-listings in
the U.S.  Ordinary listings require an exact replication of settlement facilities as for U.S.
securities and go beyond Level 2 and Level 3 ADRs in requiring full annual and quarterly reports
prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP.10 The GRS was introduced with newly-merged
DaimlerChrysler (DCX) in November 1998 and is employed today by Deutsche Bank, Celanese
and UBS. A GRS does not require an intermediary receipt like an ADR but does require a
coordination of the transfer agent, clearance and settlement procedures in the U.S., home and
other overseas markets (Karolyi, 2001). Disclosure standards are equivalent to Level 2 and 3
ADRs; DCX, for example, files an annual 20F. In our study of disclosure standards, we treat
ordinary listings and GRSs as equivalent to exchange-listed ADRs.
There is a large literature on international cross-listings (Karolyi, 1998). Much of the
early work was built using the insights of international asset pricing models with barriers to
international investment.11 I  these models, a firm located in a country that is not fully integrated
in the world markets typically faces a higher cost of capital because its risk has to be borne
mostly by investors from its country. If the firm finds a way to make it less costly for foreign
investors to hold its shares, these investors share the risk,  the cost of capital falls and the firm’s
stock price increases. A U.S. listing is a way for firms to finesse segmenting barriers and to make
                                         
9 Details are available from the three main depositary banks: Bank of New York (www.bankofny.com), JP Morgan
(www.adr.com) and Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr/www).
10 Canadian firms use ordinary listing rather than ADRs and can use Canadian GAAP that is very similar to U.S.
GAAP as permitted by the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System since 1991. See Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure
and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issues, Securities Act Release No.
6902 (July 1, 1991) and Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1998).  Among non-Canadian firms in our sample, ordinary
listings are very unusual, as are changes between ordinary listings and ADR programs.
11 Black (1974), Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), and Stulz (1981) lay the groundwork for papers by Errunza
and Losq (1985) and Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987) to develop equilibrium models of the repricing of
shares of firms cross-listing abroad.
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their shares more accessible to foreign investors. The empirical findings of Alexander, Eun and
Janakiramanan (1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1999), Miller (1999) find statistically
significant and positive stock price reactions to U.S. listing announcements and listings
consistent with the predictions from this market segmentation hypothesis.
Newer evidence suggests that there may be other forces at work. Fo rster and Karolyi
(1999) show that the share price effects and risk changes around listings are associated with
changes in the shareholder base and interpret their findings in the context of Merton’s (1987)
investor recognition hypothesis. Investors are presumed to invest only in familiar stocks and are
priced to include an incompleteness premium; when they list in the U.S., this incompleteness
premium dissipates and the stock price increases. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2000) suggest
that firms that list in the U.S. gain value because they bypass local underdeveloped markets to
access the greater liquidity and efficiency of U.S. markets. Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998) and
Moel (1999) establish a signaling equilibrium in which firms try to communicate their private
information regarding their quality to outside investors by listing their shares in overseas
markets. Their hypothesis presumes that the credibility of the signal of quality stems from the
higher level of information disclosure required by the U.S.  Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), Reese
and Weisbach (2001) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2001) argue that a U.S. listing and thus
U.S. securities law enhances the protection of investors for firms coming from poor investor
protection countries, thereby reducing the agency costs of controlling shareholders and the risk
of expropriation.
Few, if any, of these studies focus on or attempt to measure directly the value relevance
of increased disclosure associated with U.S. listings. Instead, they measure large share price
effects around listings and seek to associate them with proxies that relate to the various
hypotheses. It is important to recognize a growing accounting literature that focuses on the value
11
relevance of international accounting harmonization. Analytical studies by Huddart, Hughes and
Brunnermeier (1999) and Barth, Clinch and Shibano (1999) establish the conditions under which
firms will list based on the optimal disclosure standards defined by the exchanges or in terms of
the benefits and costs of foreign analysts becoming experts in local market GAAP. Empirical
work has explored these issues by focusing on the relative info m ness of accounting
disclosures in different countries (Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski, 1993) and the
differential response of stock prices to earnings disclosed in overseas and local markets (Frost
and Pownall, 1994). A number of more recent studies have examined stock price reactions to
Form 20-F reconciliations by foreign firms listing in the U.S. or voluntary reconciliations to
international accounting standards (IAS).12
2.3 Key Hypotheses
We structure our empirical tests around several hypotheses implied by the theoretical
literature. The models of Kim and Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b, 1994), Harris and Raviv (1993),
and Kandel and Pearson (1995) show that trading volume and price reactions to earnings
announcements are complex. The reactions depend on the information content of the public
announcement, the quality of the prior information, the cost of information acquisition and the
dispersion in investors’ opinions or the degree of private information asymmetry. Our first
hypothesis focuses on how the information environment of the firm affects the price volatility
around earnings announcements. The magnitude of the price reaction stems from the average
change in investors’ beliefs and this, in turn, depends on the magnitude of the surprise and the
                                         
12 Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993), Chan and Seow (1996), Rees and Elgers (1997), Alford and Jones (1998), Harris
and Muller (1999) and Karamanou and Raedy (2001) are useful examples of this literature. Rader (1994), Ruder
(1996), and Fox (1998) focus on the political challenges of reconciling U.S. disclosure policy with international
accounting standards. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz (2001) demonstrate significant differences in bid-ask
spread and trading volume between German firms that reconcile with IAS or U.S. GAAP and those that retain
German reporting standards.
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precision of the announcement relative to the average precision of investors’ total information. If
the quality of the information environment improves after listing in the U.S. because of the more
stringent disclosure requirements, the costs of information acquisition would decline, more
analysts would cover the stock, and the precision of the prior private information is greater.
Hypothesis 1: The abnormal absolute price change around the earnings announcement is lower
following a listing in the U.S. for a company that faces increased disclosure requirements.
We want to isolate whether the U.S. listing improves the quality of the information
environment with greater precision of, and less residual uncertainty about, the information
content of the announcement. As a result, we attempt to control for the magnitude of the earnings
surprise (deviation of actual earnings from median analyst forecast) and the change in the
number of analysts who cover the stock. Most importantly, we control for the type of U.S. listing
pursued by the company and the rigor of home-country accounting and disclosure standards to
capture the magnitude of the change in the information environment. For companies that choose
exchange listings (ordinary listings, GRSs, Level 2 or 3 ADRs) and for those that list in the U.S.
from countries with relatively poor accounting standards, we expect a more dramatic decrease in
abnormal absolute price changes around earnings announcements than that for companies that
choose OTC listings or Rule 144a private placements and for those that list from countries with
relatively good accounting standards. As a result, we offer the supplementary hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The decrease in abnormal absolute price change around the earnings
announcement following a listing in the U.S. is greater for those companies that choose listings
that require full reconciliation with U.S. GAAP and disclosure standards (Level 2/3 ADRs,
ordinary listings, GRSs) and for those companies from countries with less-developed economies
and weaker accounting systems.
13
The trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement is proportional to the
magnitude of the associated price reaction and the level of private information asymmetry or
public information disagreement among investors. Our second hypothesis positively links the
abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements to the degree of information
asymmetry or disagreement, given the magnitude of the associated price reaction:
Hypothesis 2: The abnormal trading volume around the earnings announcement is lower
(higher) following a listing in the U.S. for a company that faces increased disclosure
requirements, if there is less (more) information asymmetry or disagreement among investors.
The key to testing this second hypothesis is not only to isolate the magnitude of the
absolute price change, but also to control for the information asymmetry or disagreement. To this
end, we construct a proxy based on the number of analysts and the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts. But, our focus, again, is on the type of listing the firm seeks, the level of economic
development in the home country and the home-country disclosure standards. For companies that
choose exchange listings and for those that list in the U.S. from countries with less-developed
economies and relatively poor accounting standards, we expect a more dramatic change in
abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements than that for companies that choose
OTC listings or Rule 144a private placements and for those that list from countries with
relatively good accounting standards. If increased disclosure generates more (less) information
asymmetry, the abnormal volume reaction to earnings announcements is greater (lower). Our
supplementary hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: The increase (decrease) in abnormal trading volume around the earnings
announcement due to more (less) information asymmetry or disagreement among investors is
greater for those companies that choose listings that require full reconciliation with U.S. GAAP
and disclosure standards (Level 2/3 ADRs, ordinary listings, GRSs) and for those companies
from countries with less-developed economies and weaker accounting systems.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We obtain details of foreign firms listed in the U.S. (NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, over-the
counter, or 144A) with a depositary receipt (ADR) or ordinary listing from the Bank of New
York and other sources.13 We restrict the sample using the following criteria. First, the listing
date is available. Second, daily closing prices and trading volumes from the home market are
available from Datastream International for five years both before and after the U.S. listing. This
precludes IPOs as no information is available prior to listing in the U.S.  Third, earnings
announcement dates, values, and at least one analyst earnings forecast are available from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) records both before and after U.S. listing.14
Often a company has several stock types trading in the home market. To identify the
underlying stock type to match a DR issue, we use Bloomberg, Bridge, SEC (20-F) filings, and
web pages of depositary banks and stock exchanges. If these sources could not help to match the
DR or direct listing to the underlying security in the home market, we checked that the pricing
relationship between the DR underlying issue and the home market security is reasonably
close.15 In a few cases, a class of share is created specifically for the U.S. listing so there is no
matching issue in the home country.16 When this occurs, data are collected for the ordinary type
of security listed in the home market.
                                         
13 See, for example, www.adrbny.com and www.adr.com. Our sample is biased towards recent events and may
exclude DRs that were subsequently delisted or downgraded to a lower level program.
14 See Atiase and Bamber (1994), Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1997), and Chang, Khanna and Palepu (2000).  We do not
attempt to follow the accounting literature in, for example, restricting the sample to EPS forecasts greater that $0.10
since EPS in our context is reported in many different currencies.
15 Generally, arbitrage ensures insignificant differences between ADR and underlying share prices once the ADR
ratio and exchange rate are accounted for. Kato, Linn, and Schallheim (1991), Park and T vakkol (1994), and Miller
and Morey (1996) offer supporting evidence for this claim.
16 This may arise due to foreign ownership restrictions imposed by regulatory authorities (Bailey, Chung, and Kang,
1999), or differing dividends or voting rights assigned by companies (Nenova, 2001).
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For each stock, daily home market prices and trading volumes are collected from
Datastream, as are capitalization, local market indices and exchange rates. When possible, we
obtain return and trading volume information for all five years before and after the first listing
date in the US.  However, the available time series are often shorter. When a security is not listed
in the firm’s country of incorporation, prices and trading volumes are taken from the stock's
primary market.
Earnings announcements and forecasts are collected from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) tapes. The frequency of earnings information releases varies through
countries and firms. For cross-country consistency, we use annual earnings announcements: they
maximize the number of events over the widest range of countries. The earnings surprise equals
the difference between actual earnings and the mean of the most recent analyst forecasts
normalized by the mean forecast. To calculate the mean forecast, we take the last estimate for
each analyst reporting forecasts for the current fiscal year.
Table 2 summarizes the number of firms and number of earnings events in the sample by
country and by U.S. exchange. While there are large numbers of firms from developed countries
such as Canada (42) and the U.K. (49), there are surprisingly large numbers of firms from
developing countries such as Brazil (23), India (28), and Mexico (10). The geographical
dispersion of the countries is also high and helps increase variability in pre-listing information
environments across countries.  The number of earnings events ranges from just a handful for
China and Indonesia to over a hundred for Canada, Hong Kong, and the U.K. The majority of
firms are listed either over-the-counter (207) or as 144a (85), rather than on the NYSE (97),
NASDAQ (26), or AMEX (2). Again, this offers us a broad cross-section of listing
characteristics for empirical study. Interestingly, emerging-market firms are most likely to
establish Rule 144a private placement programs while developed-country firms typically use the
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higher-level over-the-counter route or formal listing on an exchange. Table 1 also reports an
indicator of the quality of accounting standards in each country, the index produced by the
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research and used by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) that scores annual reports based on inclusion or omission of
90 key items.17 The range of accounting standard index values (from a low of 36 for Portugal to
a high of 83 for Sweden) confirms the broad cross section of home country information
environments represented in our sample.
3.2 Event study approach
Our first tests are event studies performed on returns and trading volumes around an
earnings announcement. The estimation window is the interval (-200, -11) with respect to the
announcement day, as in existing studies. Following standard methodology as in Brown and
Warner (1985), abnormal returns are prediction errors from the market model using the local
market index.18  Stock and local index returns are log-differences expressed in the home market
currency.  Given thin trading in some of the stocks, we follow the “trade to trade” approach of
Maynes and Rumsey (1993).19  Following Kim and Verecchia (1991a), we abstract from the sign
of returns and use the absolute value of abnormal returns to measure return volatility. Abnormal
volume equals daily volume minus the mean volume over the estimation window (-200, -11)
divided by the mean volume. Similar results are obtained with abnormal volume adjusted by the
median. To implement hypothesis tests, we use the nonparametric rank test of Corrado (1989)
and Corrado and Zivney (1992) who demonstrate that their rank test is preferable in the presence
                                         
17 International Accounting and Auditing Trends (4th dition, 1997), Center for International Financial Analysis and
Research, Princeton, New Jersey.
18 Our purpose is to generate residuals using a benchmark that mimics the behavior of local returns as closely as
possible. We are not fitting an international asset-pricing model that would probably require us to use a two-factor
model with both local and world stock return aggregates.
19 Results are similar if abnormal returns are computed without controlling for infrequent trading and by restricting
the sample to more liquid firms.
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of non-normality and asymmetry.20  A parametric t-test as used by Brown and Warner (1985) is
also computed for comparison.
3.3 Cross-sectional regression tests
Abnormal returns are cumulated over three (-1, 1) day windows and transformed to proxy
for return volatility by taking the absolute value. Trading volume is normalized by the mean
trading volume and then cumulated over identical three-day event windows.21 The absolute
abnormal return and trading volume are then regressed on a set of explanatory variables
summarized in Table 5 and detailed below.
First, our cross-sectional specifications include several variables adopted from standard
practice in the earnings and dividends announcement literature.  The absolute value of the
earnings surprise (a measure of the precision of information) serves as an explanatory variable in
the cross-sectional regression to explain the absolute abnormal return in the event window. The
absolute abnormal return serves as an explanatory variable in the cross-sectional regression to
explain abnormal trading volume in the event window.  Forecast dispersion, a measure of
predisclosure information asymmetry (Atiase and Bamber, 1994) and disagreement, equals the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts (the last one before the announcement for each analyst)
divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast. It serves as an explanatory variable in cross-
sectional regressions to explain absolute abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume.
Second, we consider the possibility that the reaction to an earnings surprise depends on
the sign of the surprise (Hayn, 1995) and construct a dummy variable equal to one for positive
earnings surprises and zero otherwise. The number of analyst forecasts used to compute the
mean forecast for the particular earnings event proxies for the degree of analyst attention, one
                                         
20 Corrado and Zivney (1992) adjust for infrequent trading. When a stock trades daily, their rank statistic is identical
to Corrado (1989).
21 Results computed over seven-day (-1,5) windows for both returns and volume are very similar.
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facet of the information environment. If firms signal their quality with a U.S. listing and analysts
tend to follow higher quality firms (Chung, 2000; Rajan and Servaes, 1998), the number of
analysts following a firm increases after cross listing.
Finally, we construct variables to test our prediction that the change in information
environment upon listing in the U.S. will be greatest for firms originating in poor quality
environments. The change in information environment upon listing in the U.S. depends on the
home country environment of the listing company, which we set equal to the index constructed
by La Porta et al (1998)22 to rate the quality of information in annual reports across countries.23
We assign a dummy variable equal to one for stocks from developed countries and zero,
otherwise, according to the classification scheme of the World Bank.24 We predict that the
change in price and volume reactions to earnings after U.S. listing is greatest for firms from
emerging markets with low values of the accounting index.
4. Results
We first report the event study tests on the abnormal absolute returns and abnormal
trading volume around earnings announcements before and after listing for the full sample and
by various event-specific, firm-specific and country-level attributes. The cross-sectional
multivariate regression tests follow.
                                         
22 La Porta et al (1998) also supply indexes of legal quality and other country characteristics that differ across our
sample countries and are strongly correlated with the accounting standards index. While an enhanced legal
environment may be one reason that foreign firms seek a U.S. listing or investors value such a listing, our focus is
not on legal issues, like Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), and Reese and Weisbach (2001), but rather on the change in the
information environment engendered by a U.S. listing.
23 See Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) for a detailed comparison of disclosure standards across
developed countries.
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4.1 Event Study Results
Table 3 presents results of the event study of absolute abnormal returns and abnormal
trading volume for the entire sample of 1,273 pre-listing events and 1,422 post-listing events.
Given our concerns about non-normality in returns and volume, the table presents a variety of
statistics. The columns labeled “Before” and “After” present the means of variables in the
periods before and after U.S. listing. Asterisks indicate whether the variable is significantly
abnormal based on the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989). The columns labeled “W-
test” present a Wilcoxon non-parametric test of whether “Before” versus “After” sub-samples are
significantly different. The columns labeled “T-test” present a standard parametric test of
whether the “Before” versus “After” sub-samples are significantly different.  Both the W-test and
T-test statistics evaluate whether the “Before” period reaction is larger than the “After” period
reaction.
Table 3 indicates statistically significantly greater return volatility and volume reactions
to earnings shocks in the post-listing period. These heightened responses are particularly strong
for volume, which typically doubles its size after U.S. listing. For example, the abnormal volume
on the announcement day (as a percentage of the mean volume in the pre-event period) is 0.37
percent higher before a U.S. listing and 0.62 percent higher after a U.S. listing. This is
statistically significant by both the Wilcoxon W-test and standard T-test.  The differences in
absolute abnormal returns are less dramatic. On the announcement day in the pre-listing period,
we observe a 2.43 percent higher abnormal return, yet, in the post-listing period, it is only a 2.22
percent higher abnormal return. These are significant statistically by the W-test but not by the T-
test. Skewness is evident in a few cases where the Wilcoxon and T-test statistics have different
                                                                                                                              
24 This yields a few situations where newly-rich countries (such as Taiwan and Korea) are categorized with poorer
countries that presumably have a poorer information environment.
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sign.25 It is interesting that the abnormal returns are significantly higher in the post-listing period
on the days around the earnings announcement (days –2, +1 and +2). At the same time, the most
prominent abnormal trading volume increases in the post-listing period occur on day +1, but not
in the pre-announcement window.
We also break the event study analysis into a variety of sub-samples. Table 4 reports
abnormal absolute returns and abnormal trading volume in a window of three days, –1 through
+1, around the earnings announcement and compares those in the pre-listing and post-listing
periods. Results are reported by emerging/developed market category, by region (Asia, Europe
and the Americas), by listing type (Rule 144a, OTC and Exchange listing), by year of listing and
according to the number of analysts following the stocks. The most striking result is that firms
from developed, rather than emerging, economies show statistically significant increases in
return volatility and trading volume after U.S. listing. The cumulative absolute abnormal return
over the event period actually decreases from 3.37 percent before listing to 3.35 percent after
listing, a statistically insignificant difference, for emerging-market firms. The cumulative
absolute abnormal returns for developed market firms increases from 2.51 percent to 3.41
percent, a statistically significant increase at the 1 percent level. The cumulative abnormal
trading volume increase after listing is statistically significant for both emerging and developed
market firms and are of similar magnitudes.
This finding on return volatility and trading volume for developed-market firms is
somewhat surprising given our hypotheses that firms from less-developed markets are likely to
experience the most dramatic change in information environment upon U.S. listing. Sub-samples
based on geographic area and degree of economic development confirm this, indicating that the
                                         
25 Consider, for example, results for absolute abnormal returns at day 0.  The mean declines from 0.0243 to 0.0222
yielding a positive (though insignificant) T-test.  The Wilcoxon statistic, however, is strongly negative, suggesting
the presence of some large positive outliers in the “After” period.
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changes in return volatility and trading volume around earnings announcements are most
pronounced for “Developed Europe.”  The cumulative absolute abnormal return increases from
2.17 percent before listing to 3.14 percent after listing (W-test of –4.59) and cumulative
abnormal trading volume increases from 3.73 percent to 4.48 percent (W-test of –4.30).
Interestingly, there is no significant change for Canada, suggesting that other national
characteristics (such as the degree of difference between local and U.S. disclosure environments)
beyond mere developed country status are relevant. Equally interesting is the case of Latin
America (“Emerging America”) for which there is a large (though statistically insignificant)
decline in cumulative absolute abnormal return from 5.71 percent before listing to 3.57 percent
after listing associated with a large increase in cumulative abnormal trading volume.
Table 4 also breaks the sample by listing type into Rule 144a, OTC, and exchange
listings. The largest number of events is for OTC listings (658 pre-listing events and 703 post-
listing events) and the smallest is for 144a (219 pre-listing events and 262 post-listing events).
Surprisingly, the largest changes in event period volatility and volume are observed for over-the-
counter listings, followed by 144a placements. The increase in cumulative absolute abnormal
returns is from 2.51 percent to 3.22 percent for 144a listings and from 2.82 percent to 3.60
percent for OTC listings, statistically significant in both cases. The increase in cumulative
abnormal trading volume is from 3.55 percent to 4.41 percent for 144a listings and from 3.50
percent to 4.74 percent for OTC listings, again both statistically significant differences. There is
no significant change in either volatility or volume for exchange listings. In brief, the change in
event study reaction is greatest for lower-level listings. These findings again appear to contradict
our hypotheses that exchange listings would be associated with the largest change in return and
volume because they demand greater disclosure.  Table 1 shows that developed country firms
tend to select OTC or exchange listings. Thus, the differences in event study results across listing
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type are likely mirroring the same effects we find in comparing developed country and emerging
market results. We explore these types of interactions in the next subsection.
Figures 1 and 2 show the abnormal trading volume and volatility reactions for different
subsets of firms by days around the earnings announcements before and after listing. In some
cases, the cumulative effects are spread uniformly within the window of days –2 to +2, such as
that for developed-market firms and the increase in absolute abnormal returns (top of Figure 1).
The volume reaction (bottom of Figure 1), however, shows that the cumulative volume increase
after listing for developed-market firms is concentrated on days +1 a d +2. A similar result holds
for the 144a and OTC listings in Figure 2. The increase in cumulative absolute abnormal returns
after listing occurs uniformly over the five days in the window, but that for the cumulative
abnormal trading volume is skewed towards days +1 and +2.
Table 4 also indicates that the significant changes in event-period volatility and volume
reactions are clustered in the final three years of our sample (1997 to 1999). Because the pace of
international cross-listings has advanced, it is not surprising that the largest number of
observations for the abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume after listing occurs during
that sub-period. The relationship between the size of the return reaction and the number of
analysts is complex and non-linear. The largest increase in cumulative absolute abnormal returns
occurs for firms that have 5 to 25 analysts covering their stocks, which again is associated with
the subgroups with most observations. Volume effects are weaker, however. In subsequent tests,
we examine the significance of the change in the number of analysts after U.S. cross listing and
the explanatory power of the change in the number of analysts in cross sectional regressions.
To sum up the evidence thus far, it appears that a U.S. listing alters substantially the
information environment in a significant way: earnings shocks have a substantially greater
impact on home-country return volatility and trading volume once the stock is cross-listed in the
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U.S.  Do we infer that the precision and quality of the prior information has diminished such that
there is more noise and more residual uncertainty incorporated into prices after listing? Do we
associate the higher abnormal volume around earnings after listing with an increase in private
information asymmetry or "disagreement" due to more information and more information
processing?  It is curious that this effect is greatest for those situations (firms from developed
countries or firms that do not submit to high exchange listing standards) where we expected the
change in information environment to be relatively modest. Interestingly, the developed country
pattern relates primarily to European firms and excludes Canada.
4.2 Cross-sectional regressions
Table 5 summarizes some of the key explanatory variables used in the cross-sectional
regressions. It is evident that there are often large changes comparing the pre-listing and post-
listing periods. In particular, the number of analysts following a firm and the dispersion of
analyst forecasts increase significantly after listing. The change in the number of analysts is
greater for firms from developed countries and for firms that list as a 144a or OTC. This mirrors
our earlier finding that the post listing increase in return volatility and volume around earnings is
typically largest for developed country firms and those that list as 144a and OTC.  Furthermore,
the increase in forecast dispersion after U.S. listing is greatest for developed country firms, again
suggesting that U.S. listing leads to particularly large increases in information asymmetry or
"disagreement" in trading of developed country firms. The size of earnings surprises appears to
increase dramatically after U.S. listing, although the changes are not statistically significant.
Table 6 presents estimates of cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative absolute
abnormal returns.  Slope dummy terms are used to distinguish the pre-listing versus post-listing
associations. Panel A of the table presents three preliminary specifications to further test the
dependence of cumulative absolute abnormal returns on geography and degree of development
24
of the home country. Panel B presents the main specifications (listed as 4 through 11) which
include the firm-specific and country-level characteristics variables detailed previously.   White
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported along with adjusted R-squared.
Across all specifications, the association between absolute returns and the post listing
dummy variable is typically positive, as is suggested by Tables 3 and 4. The simple specification
(model 1) shows a statistically significant increase of 0.839 percent across all firms (t-statistic of
5.30). After controlling for the post listing change in return volatility, geographic dummies
indicate that prelisting return volatility around earnings announcements is larger for Emerging
America (that is, Latin America) and smaller for Developed Europe. Note that the benchmark
associated with the constant is defined by the Canadian sample of cross-listing firms. The
coefficient on the Emerging America post listing slope dummy term is the only one that is
significant and is negative and larger than the benchmark increase (-2.25 percent, t-statistic of –
2.55 versus constant of 1.10 percent, t-statistic of 2.35).  This indicates that the return volatility
around earnings announcements decreases upon cross listing for Latin American firms. Though
not significant, the slope dummy term is also negative for Emerging European (-0.20 percent)
and Middle Eastern/African firms (-0.54 percent). Overall, this finding is contrary to our first
hypothesis that the change in volatility reaction associated with the increased disclosure should
be greatest for developing-country companies.
One possible explanation for the larger volatility increase around earnings
announcements for developed firms is that the magnitude of the information release (earnings
surprise) may be greater and other factors that relate to the event (number of analysts, dispersion
of analyst forecasts) are different. Table 5 indicates that this is so. However, the traditional
control variables from the accounting literature (the scale of the earnings surprise, the number of
analysts following the firm, and the dispersion of earnings forecasts) are not significant in
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explaining return volatility around earnings announcements nor how it changes after cross listing
in the U.S.  In the Panel B of Table 6, various specifications (e.g. Models 7 through 11) show
that the magnitude of the earnings shock is positive but small, the dispersion of analyst forecasts
is also positive but small, and the number of analysts is negative and, at best, only marginally
significant. Following Hayn (1995), we allow for an asymmetric impact of the earnings shock to
volatility from positive and negative surprises (“positive shock” in table) and this coefficient is
positive but not significant. The key result in the table is that the volatility increase is robust to
the inclusion of these control variables.
After controlling for other factors, it appears that developed country listings and 144a
listings are still associated with lower return volatility prior to U.S. listing. Moreover, the
positive slopes on “Developed Post” and “144a Post” confirm our earlier finding that the
increase in volatility is highest for firms from developed markets and those that use listings with
only incremental disclosure requirements. It is interesting that both slope dummy variables are
significant only in the full specification (Model 11) which implies important interactions with the
control and country-level variables and listing type dummies. The strong positive slope
coefficient on accounting standards variable indicates that higher return volatility around
earnings announcements is associated with firms from countries with higher quality accounting
environments. The slope coefficient on accounting standards when interacting with the post-
listing dummy is negative and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Taken together,
these results suggest that the increase in volatility reactions to earnings is greater after cross-
listing for all firms, on average, but the increase upon listing is greater for those firms from
developed market countries with poorer accounting systems. The primary examples are firms
from countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain.
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There are large, negative coefficients on the “Positive Shock Post” slope dummy. This
finding indicates that the return volatility reaction to negative earnings surprises becomes
stronger than the return volatility reaction to positive earnings announcements in the post-listing
period.  Put another way, the sensitivity of the market to the sign of an earnings surprise is
heightened after listing in the U.S. This suggests another dimension of the change in information
environment that occurs upon cross listing in the U.S.
Table 7 presents cross-sectional results to explain abnormal trading volume in a format
similar to Table 6. Across the two panels, there is only weak evidence that abnormal trading
volume around earnings releases is more prominent after cross listing.  Overall, the cumulative
abnormal trading volume increases by 0.47 percent from an average prelisting volume reaction
of 3.95 percent. There is no evidence that patterns in trading volume or post listing changes in
trading volume relate to geographic classification or level of economic development.  In the
second panel, there is very strong evidence of a positive association between abnormal trading
volume and the contemporaneous abnormal return volatility, as indicated by the strong positive
slopes on “Absolute Return”. This suggests that listing in the U.S. generates more information,
more analysis, and therefore more information asymmetry or “disagreement” among traders.
Though the absolute return typically rises after U.S. listing, the coefficient on the corresponding
slope dummy is insignificant, suggesting that this association does not change upon cross listing.
The second panel of Table 7 indicates a strong positive relationship between abnormal
trading volume and the number of analysts covering the firm.  The coefficients on “Analysts
Post” are significantly negative and of similar scale, suggesting that this positive relationship is
neutralized after the firm lists in the U.S.  Put another way, the impact of “disagreement” that is
proportional to the number of analysts disappears once a firm cross-lists in the U.S. This occurs
even though, as indicated in Table 5, the number of analysts increases after U.S. listing,
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particularly for the developed country firms and listings within only incremental disclosure
requirements (144a or OTC). Cross listing in the U.S. induces information production and
trading activity that cannot be captured by a simple linear relationship to analyst coverage.
5. Alternative Interpretations of the Evidence
In Section 2.3, we proposed two key hypotheses that derive from the accounting and
finance literature on capital market reactions to public announcements, such as for annual
earnings, and from the literature on international cross-listings. Our special focus was on the
increased disclosure that firms face when they list their shares on U.S. markets. We first offered
that the absolute volatility reaction to earnings announcements should diminish after firms list in
the U.S. due to the higher quality and precision of the pre-disclosure prior information and the
lower costs of information acquisition we would expect in the U.S. market environment. We also
proposed that this decreased volatility reaction would be greatest for firms that come from less-
developed economies, those with weaker accounting standards, and those that pursue an
exchange listing because these firms would experience the most dramatic increase in disclosure
associated with the listing event. In Section 4 we found that the absolute abnormal return
reactions to earnings announcements actually increased after U.S. listings. Moreover, this
increase was robust even after controlling for variables associated with the magnitude of the
information event, such as the earnings surprise (including an asymmetric effect), the number of
analysts following the stock and the dispersions in their earnings forecasts. Most surprisingly, we
found that this volatility increase was greatest for those firms from developed markets and those
that face only incremental disclosure requirements by means of Rule 144a private placement and
OTC listings.  The weakness of home-country accounting standards for those cross-listed firms
explains little of the increase in volatility reactions to earnings.
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We also offered a second hypothesis that implied that abnormal trading volume reactions
around earnings announcements are positively associated with the dispersion of beliefs and
asymmetry of private information among investors. So, if we observe higher (lower) abnormal
trading volume reactions around earnings following a U.S. listing, this outcome is associated
with greater (lesser) information asymmetry or dispersion of beliefs among investors. Further,
we proposed that this change (in whichever direction) following listing should be more dramatic
for those firms from less-developed markets, those with weaker accounting standards, and those
that pursue full exchange listings requiring the largest increase in disclosure requirements. Our
findings in Section 4 on the change in volume reactions are weaker than that on the change in
volatility reactions. Overall, the volume reactions are larger following U.S. listing, which implies
greater dispersion of beliefs and greater information asymmetry among investors, but it is
primarily associated with developed-market firms and those with Rule 144a private placement
and OTC listings.
There are a number of possible explanations for these surprising findings. We explore
several that are inspired by new research in the literature in international accounting, finance, and
legal systems. First, we begin with a number of robustness tests that we performed.
5.1 Some Robustness Tests
We explored a number of alternative specifications for our tests. First, we computed
larger and smaller windows for the cumulative absolute abnormal returns and cumulative
abnormal trading volume. We also investigated some nonlinear specifications involving multiple
interactions (e.g. emerging markets and accounting standards), and particularly in regards to the
country-level variables (e.g. accounting standards) and those associated with analyst following.
We found that the most dramatic increase in absolute abnormal returns and abnormal trading
volume occurred for firms from countries with intermediate accounting standards (with index
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values below 70 and above 60). This result was further concentrated in those firms from
developed markets.  Table 8 provides some evidence.
Clustering of particularly "hot" or volatile industries in developed countries with
relatively low accounting standards might explain our finding of particularly large changes in
earnings responses after U.S. listing. Appendix A describes the industrial composition of our
sample by country. We have a large number of industrial firms (144 out of 427). Most of those
firms are concentrated in Canada, Hong Kong, India, Taiwan, and the U.K.  Consumer sector
firms, which include many segments (e.g. food and beverage, electronics, household products,
luxury goods, media and retailing), have the second largest contingent (97) and they are
concentrated in the U.K.  While the small number of firms within each country does not permit
formal tests, it does not appear that there are any obvious differences in the industry composition
of the sample across countries or regions.  Further investigation of these issues is clearly
warranted.
5.2 Earnings Management and Investor Protection
Earnings management is the act of obfuscating financial reports made to external
stakeholders with the intent of obtaining some private gain. There has been evidence of earnings
management by managers in overstating earnings prior to seasoned equity offerings (Teoh,
Welch and Wong, 1998) and when approaching potential violations of their debt covenants with
outside creditors (Sweeney, 1994). A number of papers have provided evidence of extensive
earnings management in firms around the world (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2001; Bhattacharya,
Daouk and Welker, 2001). Leuz et al., in particular, suggest that the extent of earnings
management is strongly negatively related to the scope of legal protection in the home market
because strong investor protection leads to less “diversion” and rent-seeking activities by
insiders.
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This diversion hypothesis and Leuz et al.’s supportive findings suggest that firms that
choose to list their shares in the U.S. where there is a tradition of strong legal protection of
minority investors will have less latitude in earnings management. The diversion hypothesis is
one possible explanation for the unexpected result of higher volatility reactions around earnings
announcements following U.S. listings.  While the quality and precision of prior information is
greater with a U.S. listing, the quality of the financial reports are greater and the overall
information content of the public announcement is greater. While we do try to control for
dispersion of analyst forecasts and earnings surprise, it could be that the sensitivity of return
volatility and trading volume to earnings news is simply greater in the new regime. Ideally, to get
at this issue, we should examine whether there is greater smoothing of earnings, less frequent
reporting of loss avoidance, less frequent use of accounting accruals and other similar actions
after firms cross-list their shares in the U.S.
5.3 Synchroneity of Stock Price Movements and Economic Development
Stock prices have been shown to move together more in low-income economies than in
high-income economies (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000). These authors have conjectured that the
degree to which a country protects private property rights affects both the extent to which
information is capitalized into stock prices and the sort of information that is capitalized.
Specifically, they suggest that firm-specific information is much more likely to be capitalized in
countries like the U.S. and Canada than in emerging economies like China and Indonesia. In
those markets, poor property rights make informed risk arbitrage in their markets unattractive
and stock prices are cross-sectionally more synchronous.
One reason we observe an unexpected increase in the volatility reactions around earnings
announcements for firms that list their shares in the U.S. is that firm-specific return variation
increases overall. With greater protection of property rights, risk arbitrageurs now find it worth
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their while to incorporate this information into prices. This finding is not necessarily consistent
with our finding that firms from emerging markets are less likely than developed market firms to
experience a significant increase in volatility and volume reactions upon listing. However, it
would be useful to decompose the source of the cumulative absolute abnormal returns into
components due to market-wide and firm-specific factors. In our current approach, we use a
simple market model to estimate parameters in the pre-event period to compute residuals in the
event period, but more general factor models may be worth exploring. It would also be useful to
examine whether firm-specific variation increases following a U.S. listing.
The strength of property rights and investor protection laws are critical elements of this
and the preceding explanation. In Table 8, we compute simple univariate tests of post-listing
changes in cumulative absolute abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal trading volume
according to classifications of legal tradition (English common law, French civil law,
Scandinavian and German law) following LaPorta et al. (1998).  Surprisingly, the most dramatic
increase in volatility reactions following listing occurs for those firms from developed, English-
common-law and French-civil-law markets. The largest changes in abnormal trading volume are
concentrated in the developed, English-common-law, Scandinavian-law and German-law firms.
These results represent at least indirect evidence that legal tradition and systems might matter.
5.4 Changing Composition of Ownership
While the significantly higher volatility reaction to earnings announcement following a
U.S. listing is more challenging result to explain than the higher abnormal volume, we also offer
some possible explanations for the greater dispersion of beliefs or asymmetry of private
information that is associated with higher volume. Institutional investors own a substantial
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fraction of the shares of internationally cross-listed stocks and especially ADRs.26 Utama and
Cready (1997) have shown that ownership structure, as indicated by the percentage of
outstanding shares held by institutional investors, is positively associated with trading volume
reactions around earnings announcement dates. They associate this institutional participation
with cross-investor variation in the precision of private information.
The greater dispersion of beliefs or information asymmetry may also stem from the much
more geographically diverse investor base that is likely to arise from U.S. listings. There have
been a number of studies that show that foreign investors have an informational disadvantage
and these have been used to explain phenomena associated with cross-border equity and bond
flows, the home bias puzzle and even international financial contagion.27 More recent studies, in
contrast, suggest that foreign institutional investors have superior information because of access
to international expertise and talent and considerable local resources (Grinblatt andKelohaju,
2000; Seasholes, 2000, Choe, Kho and Stulz, 2000). Seasholes, in particular, shows that foreign
investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan while local investors
do the opposite. Whichever way the asymmetry lies, there is strong evidence that it exists. A
useful extension of the current experiment is to study how the composition of the ownership base
of these cross-listing firms changes among institutional/retail and foreign/local investors and
whether this is related to the abnormal volatility and volume reactions around earnings.
5.5 Disclosure Requirements and Signaling
A number of studies have suggested that firms choose to list their shares on U.S. markets
to signal their “quality” relative to their peers (Cantale, 1998, Moel, 1998, Fuerst, 1999, Huddart,
Hughes and Brunnermeier, 1999).  Using rational expectations models to examine how public
                                         
26 See evidence in Citibank Report (July 2001) by Michael Chafkin on “U.S. Investment in Non-U.S. Equities”
http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/adr_info/chaf.pdf.
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disclosure requirements affect listing decisions by rent-seeking corporate insiders and allocation
decisions by liquidity traders seeking lowest trading costs, they establish conditions under which
exchanges competing for global order flow engage in a ‘race for the top’ in disclosure standards.
Further, when markets differ in their disclosure requirements for listed firms, the strictness of
those requirements enable managers of highly profitable firms to credibly convey their private
information regarding their firms’ future prospects.
We found little evidence to support our hypotheses of diminished abnormal volatility and
volume reaction around earnings for those firms that ‘reached for the top’ in reconciling with
U.S. GAAP through exchange listings and those firms from developing countries with poor
accounting standards. However, we did find evidence that volatility and volume reactions were
heightened following U.S. listings for developed market firms that pursued Rule 144a private
placements and OTC listings. This contrary evidence could be consistent with the complement of
the “signaling hypothesis.” Potential investors would have expected such developed market firms
to choose exchange listings because of the relative small leap to reconciliation with U.S. GAAP.
To the extent that they choose an alternative course that requires only incremental disclosure
investors perceive this as a “bad signal.” As a result, the magnitude of the update in beliefs given
the content of the earnings announcement and the dispersion of those beliefs or asymmetry of
private information surrounding the announcement is substantially greater. There is only limited
empirical evidence on Rule 144a listings, but it is generally consistent with this interpretation of
a “bad” signal. For example, Foerster and Karolyi (2000) find that Rule 144a private placements
by firms from markets with relatively strong accounting standards significantly underperform
various market benchmarks. Clearly, it would be useful to reconcile the evidence on returns
                                                                                                                              
27 See French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and K planis (1995), Tesar and Werner (1995), Brennan and Cao (1997)
and Kang and Stulz (1997).
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performance around listings and global equity offerings and in the post-listing period with our
analysis of capital market reactions around earnings announcements.
6. Conclusions
We present empirical evidence that absolute abnormal returns and abnormal trading
volume around earnings announcements by non-U.S. companies are economically and
statistically larger if they choose to list their shares on U.S. markets.  Our sample includes 2,695
earnings announcements for 427 non-U.S. companies from 44 emerging and developed
countries. These findings are surprising, given that the increased disclosure standards and
requirements these firms face by listing in the U.S. should have created a richer information
environment with higher quality (more precise) prior information, lower information acquisition
costs, and possibly lower disagreement or information asymmetry among investors. We further
show that the increase in absolute abnormal returns and trading volume is concentrated in those
firms from more developed countries and those firms that pursue U.S. listings by means of Rule
144a private placements and OTC listings, which require only incremental disclosure relative to
their home markets.
The results are robust to a number of specifications. We control for the magnitude of the
earnings surprise (using earnings forecasts by analysts), the increase in the number of analysts
following the stocks, and even the dispersion in the analysts. The absolute abnormal returns and
abnormal trading volume are cumulated over different length windows around the earnings
announcements. The results are not an artifact of U.S. listings or earnings announcements in a
particular year or years or of firms from a particular region, sector or industry.
We explore several possible interpretations of these findings. One possibility is that the
U.S. listing significantly alters the composition of the ownership mix among
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institutional/individual and local/foreign investors, which creates substantially greater dispersion
in the prior private information or interpretations of the earnings information. It could also be the
case that corporate insiders and controlling shareholders have less scope for earnings
management with a U.S. listing and the greater capital market reactions around earnings simply
reflect the greater information content of the announcements. A related hypothesis focuses on the
greater incentives for risk arbitrageurs to garner more firm-specific information about stocks
once they list in the U.S. and seek to incorporate this information into prices. The greater
volatility and volume reactions to earnings are thus due to lower synchroneity of stock price
movements that occurs in developed markets like the U.S. with strong legal protection for public
shareholders. Finally, the fact that the increased volatility and volume reactions to earnings stems
primarily from developed market firms that pursue Rule 144a private placement and OTC
listings that do not require increased disclosure may arise from investors’ negative perception of
this listing choice.
We recognize that these interpretations, though supported to some extent by our findings,
remain conjectures. We invite alternative explanations and further empirical investigations of
this issue. With our evidence to this point, however, it is difficult to support the case that these
non-U.S. firms (and the investors of the firms) committing to increased levels of disclosure
through U.S. listings gain economically and statistically significant benefits.
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Table 1. Depositary Receipt Programs by Type. Four different levels of American Depositary
Receipt programs are available with various conditions on trading, registration requirements with
the SEC (Securities Act of 1933) and reporting requirements (Securities and Exchange Act of
1934). More details are available from Bank of New York (w w.bankofny.com), JP Morgan
(www.adr.com) and Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr/www).
Item No Capital Raising Capital Raising with New Issue
Level-I Level-II Level-III Rule 144A Global Offering
Description Unlisted Listed on Major
U.S. Exchange
Offered and
Listed on
Major U.S.
Exchange
Private U.S.
Placement to
Qualified
Institutional
Buyers (QIBs)
Offer of in two
or more markets;
but not home
market of issuer
Trading
Location
OTC Pink Sheet
trading
NYSE, AMEX or
Nasdaq
NYSE, AMEX
or Nasdaq
U.S. Private
Placement
Market using
PORTAL
U.S. and
Non-U.S.
Exchanges
SEC RegistrationRegistration
Statement Form
F-6
Registration
Statement Form
F-6
Form F-1 and
F-6 for initial
public offering
None Private
placement,
as Rule144A
or, new issue,
as Level III
U.S. Reporting
Required
Exemption under
Rule 12g3-2(b)
Form 20-F filed
annually
Form 20-F
filed annually;
short forms
F-2 and F-3
used only for
subsequent
offerings
Exemption
under Rule
12g3-2(b)
Private
placement,
as Rule144A
or, new issue,
as Level III
GAAP
Requirement
No GAAP
reconciliation
required
Only Partial
reconciliation for
financials
Full GAAP
reconciliation
for financials
No GAAP
reconciliation
required
Private
placement,
as Rule144A
or, new issue,
as Level III
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.  This table describes the number of non-U.S. firms listing in the
U.S. in our sample (classified by country of origin and by type of listing) and the number of
earning announcement events available before and after listing. “Accounting” is an indicator of
the information environment in the local market and is measured with the index presented in La
Porta et al (1998).
 Code
Accounting
Standards
Number
of Firms
Events
before
Listing
Events
after
Listing
Number
of  Firms
Events
before
Listing
Events
after
Listing
Country: Listing/Exchange:
Argentina AR 45 5 8 20 144A 85 219 262
Australia AU 75 18 44 69 OTC 207 658 703
Germany BD 62 15 64 47 GDRs 10 19 28
Belgium BG 61 3 12 13 AMEX 2 9 8
Brazil BR 54 23 58 62 NAS 26 68 85
Colombia CB 50 3 4 8 NYSE 97 300 336
China CH - 3 6 5 Total  427 1273 1422
Chile CL 52 10 21 38
Canada CN 74 42 129 146 Emerging Markets:
Czech Rep CZ - 1 1 2 144A 74 176 223
Denmark DK 62 1 3 6 OTC 43 93 116
Spain ES 64 5 19 19 GDRs 10 19 28
Finland FN 77 3 10 10 AMEX 0 0 0
France FR 69 13 56 57 NAS 4 14 13
Greece GR 55 2 6 3 NYSE 25 62 78
Hong Kong HK 69 45 162 165 Total Emerging 156 364 458
Hungary HN - 4 7 7
Indonesia ID - 1 2 1 Developed Markets:
India IN 57 28 46 86 144A 11 43 39
Ireland IR - 5 18 19 OTC 164 565 587
Israel IS - 2 3 5 GDRs 0 0 0
Italy IT 62 4 16 12 AMEX 2 9 8
Japan JP 65 20 79 77 NAS 22 54 72
Korea KO 62 12 45 47 NYSE 72 238 258
LuxembourgLX 61 1 4 3 Total Developed271 909 964
Mexico MX 60 10 24 22
Malaysia MY 76 4 9 13 Total  427 1273 1422
NetherlandsNL 64 10 28 42
Norway NW 74 5 18 24
Austria OE 54 7 19 16
Peru PE 38 2 2 6
Philippines PH 65 4 5 19
Poland PO - 2 4 2
Portugal PT 36 1 2 3
Russia RS - 2 2 2
South AfricaSA 70 13 49 40
Sweden SD 83 4 5 9
Singapore SG 78 13 31 41
Slovakia SJ - 1 1 1
Switzerland SW 68 7 25 30
Taiwan TA 65 19 53 61
Thailand TH 64 2 2 2
Turkey TK 51 3 6 6
UK UK 78 49 165 156
Total 427 1273 1422
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Table 3.  Absolute Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume around Earnings
Announcements before and Cross-Listing. We report absolute abnormal returns and abnormal
volumes around earning announcements both before and after c oss-listing in the U.S. Abnormal
returns are residuals from the one-factor OLS market model. Abnormal volumes are obtained by
the difference of volume and the mean volume computed over the estimation window (-200, -11)
divided by the mean volume. Similar results are obtained if abnormal volume is adjusted by the
median instead. Corrado's (1989) nonparametric rank test is computed to test for significance. **
and * indicate 5% and 10% significance respectively. We also test whether return volatility and
abnormal volume are significantly different before and after cross-listing. Wilcoxon two-sample
nonparametric tests (“W-test”) and ordinary T-tests (“T-test”) are computed and reported below.
Median two-sample nonparametric tests are also computed (not reported) to check for
robustness.
Absolute Abnormal Return Abnormal Trading Volume
Day Before After W-testT-test Before After W-testT-test
-20 0.0148 0.0162 -1.54 -1.62 0.0950 0.0595 -0.30 0.66
-19 0.0144** 0.0161 -2.72 -2.00 0.0773 0.0832 -1.95 -0.09
-18 0.0164 0.0158 -0.04 0.67 0.1123 0.0467 -0.47 1.14
-17 0.0153 0.0161 -0.10 -0.92 0.0336 0.0057 -1.59 0.51
-16 0.0142** 0.0164 -2.94 -2.75 0.1228 0.0278 0.28 1.57
-15 0.0145 0.0167 -2.49 -2.96 0.0968 0.1382 -1.97 -0.62
-14 0.0148 0.0163 -2.17 -2.01 0.1998 0.0733 -0.10 1.65
-13 0.0148 0.0152 -1.33 -0.53 0.0085 0.0260 -0.44 -0.37
-12 0.0140 0.0166* -3.77 -3.54 0.0441 0.1079 -1.51 -1.02
-11 0.0157 0.0159 -1.13 -0.19 0.1161 0.1911 -1.39 -0.55
-10 0.0153 0.0159 -0.52 -0.84 0.1124 0.1769 -0.17 -0.69
-9 0.0160* 0.0155 0.33 0.67 0.2697 0.1117 -0.74 1.69
-8 0.0161 0.0156 0.19 0.58 0.1476 0.1889 -2.53 -0.41
-7 0.0152 0.0164 -3.32 -1.35 0.1301 0.2552 -3.18 -0.86
-6 0.0151 0.0167 -2.75 -1.98 0.1478 0.2131 -3.54 -0.74
-5 0.0162 0.0172 -1.88 -1.23 0.1816 0.3002* -2.78 -0.88
-4 0.0163 0.0165 -1.83 -0.22 0.5443 0.3590* -2.34 0.46
-3 0.0160 0.0170 -1.76 -1.12 0.2896** 0.2451 -0.10 0.38
-2 0.0166** 0.0184** -2.51 -2.01 0.2657* 0.3439** -2.28 -0.50
-1 0.0172** 0.0183** -2.00 -1.21 0.2337** 0.4079** -2.96 -1.31
0 0.0243 0.0222** -4.97 0.32 0.3715** 0.6248** -3.95 -1.70
1 0.0164* 0.0187** -3.37 -2.57 0.2979** 0.6528** -3.24 -2.89
2 0.0157* 0.0176* -2.19 -2.38 0.2693** 0.5436** -3.53 -1.82
3 0.0143 0.0157 -1.61 -1.93 0.1703 0.3517* -3.26 -1.78
4 0.0150 0.0167 -2.22 -2.23 0.1677 0.1641 -1.86 0.05
5 0.0166 0.0162 -1.14 0.42 0.1743 0.2594* -1.95 -1.01
6 0.0160 0.0159 0.16 0.14 0.4131 0.2080 -0.85 1.58
7 0.0146 0.0158 -1.72 -1.48 0.1658 0.3557 -1.35 -1.31
8 0.0148 0.0160 -1.70 -1.63 0.1658 0.2768 -2.46 -0.85
9 0.0157 0.0156 -0.87 0.12 0.2069* 0.3106 -0.42 -1.01
10 0.0155 0.0164 -0.53 -0.68 0.2142* 0.1732 0.31 0.55
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Table 4. Univariate tests on cumulative absolute abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal trading volume. Averages of
cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes in a 3-day window (-1,+1) around the earnings event are averaged for the period
before versus after U.S. listing. “N” indicates the number of earnings events in the category. Wilcoxon two-sample nonparametric
tests (“W-test”) indicate whether the difference across time periods is significant.  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5%
levels respectively. A negative test statistic indicates that the variable is typically larger in the post listing period.
Cumulative Absolute Abnormal Returns (-1, +1) Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volume (-1, +1)
Categories Before Listing After Listing W-test Before Listing After Listing W-test
All 12710.02756 14210.03383 -5.09** 1056 3.73101 1324 4.50813 -4.03**
Emerging 362 0.03375 457 0.03335 -1.52 252 3.30885 402 4.57799 -2.14*
Developed 909 0.02509 964 0.03406 -4.92** 804 3.86333 922 4.47768 -4.06**
By Region
Emerging Asia 168 0.02428 234 0.03347 -2.19* 127 3.71284 227 4.31060 -1.83
Developed Asia 316 0.02625 352 0.03483 -2.19* 297 3.59221 352 4.16463 -2.43*
Emerging Europe 26 0.03101 22 0.03925 0.62 24 3.51806 20 3.89157 0.72
Developed Europe 464 0.02169 466 0.03140 -4.59** 380 3.73734 429 4.48502 -4.30**
Middle East, Africa 52 0.02663 45 0.02890 1.53 45 3.03114 45 3.85763 2.33*
Emerging America 92 0.05705 134 0.03567 1.60 32 2.42093 88 6.38782 0.37
Canada 129 0.03445 146 0.04071 -0.80 127 4.87435 141 5.23688 0.27
By Listing Type
144 219 0.02509 262 0.03221 -2.89** 173 3.54560 250 4.41311 -2.96**
OTC listing 657 0.02815 703 0.03600 -4.20** 558 3.50284 648 4.74271 -3.56**
Exchange listed 377 0.02800 429 0.03157 -1.71 317 4.25485 401 4.27664 -0.50
By Year
1989 to 1992 496 0.02410 81 0.01868 -1.45 398 3.01935 73 3.38514 0.70
1993 to 1994 402 0.02999 185 0.02892 0.34 335 4.06527 173 3.95750 1.11
1995 to 1996 282 0.02895 413 0.02758 1.26 245 3.98741 390 4.33735 -1.09
1997 to 1999 91 0.03133 742 0.04019 -3.00** 78 5.12134 688 4.86255 2.68**
By Analyst Coverage
Up to 4 analysts 401 0.03262 192 0.03301 0.89 317 3.58683 176 3.52800 -0.09
5 to 12 analysts 522 0.02541 475 0.03558 3.44** 437 3.53709 446 4.76891 -2.00*
13 to 25 analysts 296 0.02486 503 0.03425 -3.69** 252 4.03292 458 4.79887 -0.63
26 or more analysts 52 0.02535 251 0.03031 1.98* 50 4.81836 244 4.19271 0.54
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Table 5. Descriptions and summary statistics for key explanatory variables. This table
presents pre-listing and post-listing averages for several characteristics used as explanatory
variables in subsequent regressions. Wilcoxon two-sample nonparametric statistics test (“W-
test”) whether the number of analysts forecasting earnings for a firm, the size of the earnings
surprise, the market value of the firm, and the predisclosure information asymmetry proxy are
significantly different before and after an international cross-listing.
Variable Description By Type Before
Listing
After
Listing
Difference
(W-test)
Analysts Number of analysts who give
earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S
for a given firm during the
current fiscal year. Proxy for
the amount of research
devoted to a firm.
All
Emerging
Developed
Rule 144a
OTC
GDRs
AMEX
NAS
NYSE
9.45
5.81
10.90
5.51
10.40
2.84
9.78
7.78
11.02
15.56
11.14
17.65
11.79
17.07
7.39
13.75
11.55
17.07
6.11
5.33
6.75
6.28
6.67
4.55
3.97
3.77
6.05
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
Earnings
Surprise
Absolute value of announced
earning minus latest available
mean of I/B/E/S forecasts,
divided by the absolute value
of the mean forecast
All
Emerging
Developed
2.11
5.15
0.27
3.92
7.45
2.24
1.81
2.30
1.97
Market CapMarket Capitalization in
millions of US dollars
All
Emerging
Developed
3,093
1,249
3.677
4,721
1.672
6.006
1,628
423
2,329
**
**
Dispersion Standard deviation of last
analysts' forecasts divided by
the absolute value of the mean
forecast. Proxy for
predisclosure information
asymmetry
All
Emerging
Developed
0.24
0.35
0.31
1.29
0.67
1.59
1.05
0.32
1.28
**
**
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Table 6.  Cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative absolute abnormal returns. This table
reports cross-sectional regressions to explain the cumulative absolute abnormal return in a 3-day window
(-1, +1) around earnings events. Geographic, development, listing type, and post listing variables are
dummy variables. Slope dummy variables indicated by “Post” suffix equal zero if the earnings event
occurs before the U.S. listing. White heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported beneath each
estimated coefficient. See Table 5 and the text for detailed descriptions of variables.
Panel A: By Region
Variables 1 2 3
Constant 0.02594 0.02886 0.02929
(27.71) (11.22) (13.55)
Emerging Asia -0.00586
(-1.80)
Developed Asia -0.00093
(-0.28)
Emerging Europe -0.00163
(-0.22)
Developed Europe -0.00702
(-2.45)
Middle East, Africa -0.00540
(-1.11)
Emerging America 0.01681
(2.43)
Developed -0.00440
(-1.84)
Post Listing Dummy 0.00839 0.01099 0.00398
(5.30) (2.35) (1.39)
Emerging Asia Post 0.00021
(0.04)
Developed Asia Post -0.00347
(-0.56)
Emerging Europe Post -0.00195
(-0.14)
Developed Europe Post -0.00073
(-0.14)
Middle East, Africa Post -0.00541
(-0.75)
Emerging America Post -0.02246
(-2.55)
Developed Post 0.00589
(1.71)
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.019 0.012
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Table 6.  Cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative absolute abnormal returns. (continued)
Panel B: By Attributes
Variables 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Constant 0.025780.026100.029800.025980.028290.026230.026200.03280
(16.15) (27.37) (13.31) (15.24) (12.92) (10.80 (15.18) (9.67)
Developed -0.00482 -0.00376 -0.00819
(-1.97) (-1.48) (-2.40)
144A -0.00202 -0.00266 -0.00738
(-0.78) (-0.96) (-2.19)
OTC 0.00087 0.00110 0.00160
(0.41) (0.52) (0.74)
Accounting (´102) 0.000060.00008 0.000060.00008
(1.98) (2.45) (2.21) (2.57)
Dispersion 0.001170.001170.001180.001170.00120
(1.24) (1.26) (1.24) (1.25) (1.28)
Earning shock 0.000110.000130.000040.00006-0.00009
(0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (-0.06)
Positive shock 0.002920.002830.002840.002940.00249
(1.58) (1.54) (1.53) (1.59) (1.35)
Analysts -0.00020-0.00011-0.00021-0.00018-0.00016
(-1.57) (-0.97) (-1.81) (-1.68) (-1.34)
Post listing dummy0.006090.008050.003060.012770.008810.010490.012000.00112
(2.52) (5.05) (1.06) (3.62) (2.44) (2.60) (3.36) (0.24)
Developed Post 0.00661 0.007303 0.01180
(1.92) (1.89) (2.67)
144A Post 0.00405 0.00375 0.01070
(1.02) (0.92) (2.34)
OTC Post 0.00346 0.00357 0.00303
(0.99) (1.00) (0.85)
Accounting Post -0.00015-0.00017 -0.00015-0.00018
(-1.64) (-1.88) (-1.65) (-1.94)
Dispersion Post 0.003230.003330.003250.003370.00346
(1.49) (1.53) (1.50) (1.57) (1.62)
Earning shock Post -0.00023-8.5E-05-0.00013-2.9E-050.00029
(-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.01) (0.09)
Positive shock Post -0.00977-0.00994-0.00968-0.00981-0.00960
(-3.42) (-3.42) (-3.38) (-3.44) (-3.32)
Analysts Post 0.00001-0.000090.000030.00004-0.00004
(0.09) (-0.49) (0.15) (0.27) (-0.20)
Adjusted RSQ 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.023
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Table 7.  Cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative abnormal trading volume. This table
reports cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative abnormal trading volume in a 3-day window (-1,
+1) around earnings events. Geographic, development, listing type, and post listing variables are dummy
variables. Slope dummy variables indicated by “Post” suffix equal zero if the earnings event occurs
before ADR introduction. White et roscedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported beneath each
estimated coefficient. See Table 4 and the text for detailed descriptions of variables.
Panel A: By Region
Variables 1 2 3
Constant 3.950044.650703.61057
(24.41) (6.21) (11.48)
Emerging Asia -0.61008
(-0.68)
Developed Asia -0.82945
(-1.03)
Emerging Europe -0.75936
(-0.68)
Developed Europe -0.77945
(-1.01)
Middle East, Africa -1.59685
(-1.63)
Emerging America -1.02314
-0.93
Developed 0.42378
(1.16)
Post Listing dummy 0.467500.52510 .05080
(2.06) (0.51) (0.12)
Emerging Asia Post -0.40079
(-0.32)
Developed Asia Post 0.05642
(0.05)
Emerging Europe Post -0.55989
(-0.36)
Developed Europe Post 0.26854
(0.25)
Middle East, Africa Post 0.13372
(0.11)
Emerging America Post -1.65018
(-1.24)
Developed Post 0.61907
(1.25)
Adjusted RSQ 0.002 0.005 0.006
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Table 7.  Cross-sectional regressions to explain cumulative abnormal trading volume. (continued).
Panel B: By Attributes
Variables 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Constant 4.476013.952483.597922.709692.606373.190392.708692.67679
(11.61) (24.30) (10.99) (8.38) (6.32) (6.71) (8.34) (5.00)
Developed 0.43745 0.16553 0.65331
(1.16) (0.44) (1.54)
144A -0.59971 -0.29936 0.11512
(-1.10) (-0.56) (0.21)
OTC -0.78649 -0.74181 -0.79254
(-1.85) (-1.75) (-1.85)
Accounting (´102) 0.00002-0.00002 -0.00001-0.00003
(0.20) (-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.30)
Absolute return 30.177430.125530.060530.181530.0417
(4.55) (4.55) (4.60) (4.55) (4.59)
Earning shock 0.075510.071010.092140.075760.08340
(0.58) (0.54) (0.66) (0.59) (0.59)
Positive shock -0.09992-0.10251-0.15135-0.10063-0.14541
(-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-0.32) (-0.44)
Analysts 0.047810.045360.048200.047860.04366
(2.36) (2.21) (2.46) (2.36) (2.20)
Post listing dummy-0.095100.466900.035880.29596-0.08971-0.133830.31193-0.55374
(-0.19) (2.05) (0.08) (0.67) (-0.16) (-0.22) (0.71) (-0.88)
Developed Post 0.63701 0.95583 1.01541
(1.24) (1.84) (1.89)
144A Post 0.69824 0.26055 0.74858
(0.92) (0.35) (1.07)
OTC Post 0.82626 0.62539 0.48774
(1.47) (1.14) (0.87)
Accounting Post 0.00002-0.00004 0.000090.00002
(0.01) (-0.32) (0.62) (0.15)
Absolute return Post 10.0840 9.6766 10.256510.17119.71344
(1.10) (1.06) (1.12) (1.10) (1.06)
Earning shock Post -0.36996-0.32679-0.38769-0.37064-0.32951
(-1.30) (-1.12) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.12)
Positive shock Post 0.423820.324280.475780.425260.33483
(1.00) (0.77) (1.10) (1.00) (0.78)
Analysts Post -0.05574-0.06873-0.05555-0.05648-0.06661
(-2.34) (-2.76) (-2.40) (-2.36) (-2.76)
Adjusted RSQ 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.085 0.089 0.085 0.084 0.092
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Table 8. Robustness tests on cumulative absolute abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal trading volume. Avera es of
cumulative abnormal returns and trading volumes in a 3-day window (-1,+1) around the earnings event are averaged for the period
before versus after ADR listing. “N” indicates the number of earnings events in the category. W lcoxon two-sample nonparametric
tests (“W-test”) indicate whether the difference across time periods is significant.  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5%
levels respectively. A negative test statistic indicates that the variable is typically larger in the post listing period.
Cumulative Absolute Abnormal Return (-1,+1)Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volume  (-1,+1)
Before US
ListingAfter US ListingDifference
Before US
Listing After US Listing Difference
Category N Mean N Mean W-test N Mean N Mean W-test
English law, developed 549 0.02806 5960.03742-2.83** 5144.01228 5644.64695 -2.27*
English law, emerging 109 0.02718 1460.02988-1.12 69 3.24789 1394.20456 -1.52
French law, developed 133 0.01932 1460.02578-2.48* 98 3.72111 1444.04925 -1.24
French law, emerging 135 0.04933 1850.03454 1.33 74 2.80430 1394.96940 1.04
German law, developed 187 0.01992 1700.02970 3.16** 1673.64239 1694.33037 -3.13**
German law, emerging 98 0.02122 1080.03372-2.60** 91 3.85286 1084.48779 -2.68**
Scandinavian law, developed 36 0.02879 490.03350-0.70 25 2.83446 44 3.94645 -2.34*
Accounting standard <60, developed 39 0.01733 380.03067 1.89 21 3.00470 19 4.41686 1.38
Accounting standard <60, emerging 175 0.04436 2530.03579 0.57 79 2.94170 1985.39854 -1.36
Accounting standard >59, <70, developed468 0.02233 4710.03301-4.18** 4073.72131 4664.32807 -3.94**
Accounting standard >59, <70, emerging129 0.02312 1510.03228-1.94* 1213.60467 1513.86208 -1.26
Accounting standard >69, developed402 0.02905 4550.03544-2.08* 3764.06503 4374.63988 -1.62
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Appendix A.  Industrial Composition of Sample Firms. This table categorizes sample firms by
industry group. "Commercial Industrial" includes aerospace, airlines, autos, chemicals, construction,
electrical, engineering, office equipment, packaging, rubber, steel, services, technology, textile, and
transportation. "Consumer" includes beverage, consumer electronics, cosmetics, drugs, food and tobacco,
household products, hotel, luxury goods, media and entertainment, publishing, and retailing.  "Natural
resource" includes mining, oil and gas, paper and forestry.
Country CodeTotal firms
Banking,
Insurance,
Real
Estate
Commercial,
Industrial Consumer
Multi sector,
other
Natural
resource Telecom Utility
Argentina AR 5 2 0 1 0 0 2 0
Australia AU 18 2 2 3 2 9 0 0
Germany BD 15 4 6 2 2 0 0 1
Belgium BG 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Brazil BR 23 2 9 5 0 4 0 3
Colombia CB 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
China CH 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Chile CL 10 1 0 3 1 0 2 3
Canada CN 42 3 14 7 1 13 3 1
Czech Rep CZ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark DK 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain ES 5 3 0 0 0 1 1 0
Finland FN 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0
France FR 13 3 5 4 1 0 0 0
Greece GR 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong HK 45 15 12 9 6 0 0 3
Hungary HN 4 0 2 1 1 0 0 0
Indonesia ID 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
India IN 28 1 18 3 2 1 2 1
Ireland IR 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
Israel IS 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Italy IT 4 1 0 2 0 0 1 0
Japan JP 20 2 8 9 1 0 0 0
Korea KO 12 3 5 3 0 0 0 1
Luxembourg LX 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico MX 10 1 4 3 1 1 0 0
Malaysia MY 4 0 1 2 1 0 0 0
Netherlands NL 10 4 2 3 0 1 0 0
Norway NW 5 0 3 0 1 1 0 0
Austria OE 7 1 2 1 0 2 0 1
Peru PE 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Philippines PH 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
Poland PO 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal PT 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Russia RS 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
South Africa SA 13 1 2 4 2 4 0 0
Sweden SD 4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Singapore SG 13 3 5 3 2 0 0 0
Slovenia SJ 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Switzerland SW 7 2 3 1 1 0 0 0
Taiwan TA 19 3 14 2 0 0 0 0
Thailand TH 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey TK 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
UK UK 49 7 11 19 3 4 2 3
All 427 75 144 97 33 44 17 17
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Figure 1. Absolute Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume Around Earnings
Announcements Before and After US Listing for Emerging and Developed Market Firms
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Figure 2. Absolute Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume Around Earnings
Announcements Before and After US Listing for Rule 144a, OTC and Exchange Listings
Absolute Abnormal Returns Around Earnings Announcements Before and After U.S. Listing
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